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We analyze maximization of revenue in the dynamic and stochastic knapsack
problem where a given capacity needs to be allocated by a given deadline to se-
quentiallyarrivingagents. Eachagentisdescribedbyatwo-dimensionaltypethat
reﬂects his capacity requirement and his willingness to pay per unit of capacity.
Typesareprivateinformation. Weﬁrstcharacterizeimplementablepolicies. Then
we solve the revenue maximization problem for the special case where there is
private information about per-unit values, but capacity needs are observable. Af-
ter that we derive two sets of additional conditions on the joint distribution of
values and weights under which the revenue maximizing policy for the case with
observableweightsisimplementable,andthusoptimalalsoforthecasewithtwo-
dimensional private information. In particular, we investigate the role of concave
continuation revenues for implementation. We also construct a simple policy for
which per-unit prices vary with requested weight but not with time, and we prove
that it is asymptotically revenue maximizing when available capacity and time to
the deadline both go to inﬁnity. This highlights the importance of nonlinear as
opposed to dynamic pricing.
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1. Introduction
The knapsack problem is a classic combinatorial optimization problem with numerous
practical applications: several objects with given, known capacity needs (or weights)
and given, known values must be packed into a “knapsack” of given capacity to maxi-




We are grateful to the German Science Foundation for ﬁnancial support. We wish to thank the co-editor
and two anonymous referees for many helpful remarks.
Copyright © 2011 Deniz Dizdar, Alex Gershkov, and Benny Moldovanu. Licensed under the Creative Com-
mons Attribution-NonCommercial License 3.0. Available athttp://econtheory.org.
DOI: 10.3982/TE700158 Dizdar, Gershkov, and Moldovanu Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
Ross and Tsang 1989), objects sequentially arrive over time and their weight–value com-
bination is stochastic but becomes known to the designer at arrival times. Objects can-
not be recalled later, so it must be decided upon arrival whether an object is included
or not. Several applications that come to mind are logistic decisions in the freight trans-
portation industry, the allocation of ﬁxed capacities in the travel and leisure industries
(e.g., airlines, trains, hotels, rental cars), the allocation of ﬁxed equipment or personnel
in a given period of time (e.g., equipment and personnel for medical procedures in an
emergency), the allocation of ﬁxed budgets to investment opportunities that appear se-
quentially, the allocation of research and development funds to emerging ideas, and the
allocation of dated advertising space on web portals.
In the present paper we add incomplete information to the dynamic and stochastic
setting. In this way, we obtain a dynamic monopolistic screening problem: there is a
ﬁnite number of periods, and at each period a request for capacity arrives from an agent
who is impatient and privately informed about both his valuation per unit of capacity
and the needed capacity.1 Each agent derives positive utility if he gets the needed ca-
pacity (or more), and zero utility otherwise. The designer accepts or rejects the requests
so as to maximize the revenue obtained from the allocation.
The dynamic and stochastic knapsack problem with complete information about
values and requests was analyzed by Papastavrou et al. (1996)a n db yKleywegt and
Papastavrou (2001). These authors characterize optimal policies in terms of weight-
dependent value thresholds. Kincaid and Darling (1963)a n dGallego and van Ryzin
(1994) look at a model that can be reinterpreted as having (one-dimensional) incom-
plete information about values, but in their frameworks all requests have the same
known weight.2 In particular, Gallego and van Ryzin show that optimal revenue is con-
cave in capacity in the case of equal weights. Kleywegt and Papastavrou give examples
showing that total value is not necessarily globally concave in capacity if the weight re-
quests are heterogeneous, and provide a sufﬁcient condition for this structural prop-
erty to hold. Gallego and van Ryzin also show that the optimal policy, which exhibits
complicatedtimedynamics, canoftenbereplacedbyasimpletime-independentpolicy
without much loss: the simple policy performs asymptotically optimal as the number of
periods and the units to be sold go to inﬁnity. Finally, Gershkov and Moldovanu (2009)
generalizetheGallego–vanRyzinmodeltoincorporateobjectswiththesameweightbut
with several qualities that are equally ranked by all agents, independently of their types
(which are also one dimensional).
The theory of multidimensional mechanism design is relatively complex: the main
problem is that incentive compatibility—which in the one-dimensional case often re-
duces to a monotonicity constraint—imposes, besides a monotonicity requirement, an
integrability constraint that is not easily included in maximization problems (see ex-
amples in Rochet 1985, Armstrong 1996, Jehiel et al. 1999,a n dt h es u r v e yo fRochet and
Stole2003). Ourimplementationproblemisspecialthoughbecauseusefuldeviationsin
1Our results are easily extended to the setting where arrivals are stochastic and/or time is continuous.
2We refer the reader to the book by Talluri and Van Ryzin (2004) for references to the large literature on
revenue (or yield) management that adopts variations on these models.Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Revenue maximization in the knapsack problem 159
the weight dimension can only be one-sided (upward). This feature allows a less cum-
bersome characterization of implementable policies that can be embedded in the dy-
namic analysis under certain conditions on the joint distribution of values and weights
of the arriving agents. Other multidimensional mechanism design problems with re-
stricted deviations in one or more dimensions have been studied by Blackorby and Sza-
lay (2007), Che and Gale (2000), Iyengar and Kumar (2008), Kittsteiner and Moldovanu
(2005), and Pai and Vohra (2009).
1.1 Outline and preview of results
We ﬁrst characterize implementable policies, as explained above. Then we solve the
revenue maximization problem for the case where there is private information about
per-unit values, but weights are observable. We will sometimes refer to this as the re-
laxed problem. Under a standard monotonicity assumption on virtual values, this is the
virtual value analog of the problem solved by Papastravou, Rajagopalan, and Kleywegt.
TheresultingoptimalpolicyisMarkovian,isdeterministic,andhasathresholdproperty
with respect to virtual values. It is important to emphasize that this policy need not be




the revenue maximizing policy for the case with observable weights is implementable,
and thus optimal also for the case with two-dimensional private information. The ﬁrst
condition—which is satisﬁed in a variety of intuitive settings—is a hazard rate ordering
that expresses a form of positive correlation between weights and values. It ensures that
the incentive constraint in the capacity dimension is never binding. Related conditions
can be found in previous work on multidimensional mechanism design with restricted
deviations mentioned above, e.g., in the papers of Pai and Vohra, Iyengar and Kumar, or
Blackorby and Szalay. More interestingly, we also draw a connection between incentive
compatibility and the structural property of concavity of revenue in capacity. Concav-
ity of optimal revenue in the relaxed problem creates a tendency to set higher virtual
value thresholds for higher capacity requests. It is then less attractive for agents to over-
state their capacity needs, which facilitates the implementation of the relaxed solution
by relaxing the incentive constraints. We quantify this relation in our second set of addi-
tional conditions: concavity of revenue combined with a (substantial) weakening of the
hazard rate order imply implementability of the relaxed solution. For completeness, we
also brieﬂy translate to our model the sufﬁcient condition for concavity of revenue due
to Papastavrou, Rajagopalan, and Kleywegt so as to obtain a condition on the model’s
primitives.
In the second part of the paper we construct—for general distributions of weights
and values—a time-independent, nonlinear price schedule that is asymptotically rev-
enue maximizing when the available capacity and the time to the deadline both go to
inﬁnity, and when weights are observable. This extends an asymptotic result by Gallego
and van Ryzin (for a detailed discussion, see Section 5) and suggests that complicated160 Dizdar, Gershkov, and Moldovanu Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
dynamic pricing may not bethatimportant for revenuemaximization if thedistribution
of agents’ types is known. Our result emphasizes though that nonlinear pricing remains
asymptotically important in dynamic settings. As a nice link to the ﬁrst part of the pa-
per, the constructed nonlinear price schedule turns out to be implementable for the
case with two-dimensional private information if the weakened hazard rate condition
employed in our discussion of concavity is satisﬁed. Since prices are time-independent,
thepolicyisalsoimmunetostrategicbuyerarrivals(whichwedonotmodelhereexplic-
itly). We also point out that a policy that varies with time but not with requested weight
(whose asymptotic optimality in the complete information case was established by (Lin
et al. 2008) is usually not optimal under incomplete information.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the dynamic model and
the informational assumptions about values and weights. In Section 3 we character-
ize incentive compatible allocation policies. In Section 4 we focus on dynamic revenue
maximization. We ﬁrst characterize the revenue maximizing policy for the case where
values are private information but weight requests are observable. We then offer two re-
sults that exhibit conditions under which the above policy is incentive compatible, and
thus optimal also for the case where both values and weights are private information.
Section 5 contains the asymptotic analysis.
2. The model
The designer has a “knapsack” of given capacity C ∈ R that he wants to allocate in a
revenue maximizing way to several agents in at most T<∞ periods. In each period,
an impatient agent arrives with a demand for capacity characterized by a weight (or
quantity request) w and by a per-unit value v.3 While the realization of the random
vector (w v) is private information to the arriving agent, its distribution is assumed to
be common knowledge and given by the joint cumulative distribution function F(w v),
with continuously differentiable density f(w v)>0,d e ﬁ n e do n[0 ∞)2. Demands are
independent across different periods.4
In each period, the designer decides on a capacity to be allocated to the arriv-
ing agent (possibly none) and on a monetary payment. Type (w v)’s utility is given
by wv − p if at price p he is allocated a capacity w  ≥ w and by −p if he is assigned
an insufﬁcient capacity w  <w . Each agent observes the remaining capacity of the
designer.5 Finally, we assume that for all w, the conditional virtual value functions
ˆ v(v w) := v − (1 − F(v|w))/f(v|w) are unbounded as a function of v and strictly mono-
tone increasing in v with ∂ˆ v(v w)/∂v > 0 for all (w v).
3It is an easy extension to assume that the arrival probability per period is given by p<1.
4As pointed out by a referee, the results of Sections 3 and 4 apply also with the obvious modiﬁcations if
types in different periods are independent, but not necessarily drawn from identical distributions.
5Alternatively, we can assume that each agent observes the entire history of the previous allocations.
These assumptions are innocuous in the following sense: when we analyze revenue maximization in Sec-
tion 4, we ﬁrst solve for the optimal policy in the relaxed problem with observable weight types w.W et h e n
provide conditions for when this relaxed solution is implementable. Since in the case of observable weight
requests,thesellercannotgainbyhidingtheavailablecapacity,thesellercannotincreaseexpectedrevenue
by hiding the remaining capacity in the original problem.Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Revenue maximization in the knapsack problem 161
3. Incentive compatible policies
To characterize the revenue maximizing scheme, we may restrict attention, without loss
ofgenerality,todirectmechanismswhereeveryagent,uponarrival,reportsatype (w v)
and the mechanism then speciﬁes an allocation and a payment. In this section, we
characterize incentive compatibility for a class of allocation policies that necessarily
contains the revenue maximizing one. The schemes we develop also have an obvious
and immediate interpretation as indirect mechanisms, where the designer sets menus
of per-unit prices depending on time and on the remaining capacity.
An allocation rule is called deterministic and Markovian if, at any period t = 1     T
and for any possible type of agent arriving at t, it uses a nonrandom allocation rule that
depends only on the arrival time t, on the declared type of the arriving agent, and on
the still available capacity at period t, denoted by c. The restriction to these policies is
innocuous as shown in Section 4.
We can assume without loss of generality that a deterministic Markovian allocation
rule for time t with remaining capacity c has the form αc
t :[0 +∞)2 →{ 1 0},w h e r e1 (0)
means that the reported capacity demand w is satisﬁed (not satisﬁed). Indeed, it never
makessense toallocateaninsufﬁcient quantity 0 <w   <wbecauseindividually rational
agents are not willing to pay for this. Alternatively, allocating more capacity than the re-
ported demand is useless as well: Such allocations do not further increase agents’ utility
while they may decrease continuation values for the designer. Let qc
t :[0 +∞)2 → R be
the associated payment rule.
Proposition 1. A deterministic, Markovian allocation rule {αc
t}t c is implementable if
and only if for every t and every c, it satisﬁes the following two conditions.6
(i) For all (w v), v  ≥ v, αc
t(w v) = 1 ⇒ αc
t(w v ) = 1.
(ii) The function wpc
t(w) is nondecreasing in w,w h e r epc
t(w) = inf{v/αc
t(w v) = 1}.7
When the above two conditions are satisﬁed, the allocation rule {αc







t(w v) = 1
0 if αc
t(w v) = 0
constitute an incentive compatible policy.
See the Appendix for all proofs.
The threshold property embodied in condition (i) of the proposition is standard and
is a natural feature of welfare maximizing rules under complete information. When
there is incomplete information in the value dimension, this condition imposes lim-
itations on the payments that can be extracted in equilibrium. Condition (ii) is new:
6Here we use “implementable” in the standard sense from the mechanism design literature. An alloca-
tion rule is implementable if we can associate to it a payment rule such that any agent ﬁnds it optimal to
truthfully reveal her type when faced with the combined allocation–payment scheme.
7We set pc
t(w) =∞if the set {v/αc
t(w v) = 1} is empty.162 Dizdar, Gershkov, and Moldovanu Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
it reﬂects the limitations imposed in our model by the incomplete information in the
weight dimension. We note that the above simple result is based on a combination of
three main factors: (1) Due to our special utility function and to the pursued goal of
revenue maximization, it is sufﬁcient to consider only policies that allocate either the
demanded weight to the agent or nothing. (2) The monotonicity requirement behind
incentive compatibility boils down to the above simple conditions. (3) The integrability
condition is automatically satisﬁed by all monotone allocation rules in the considered
class. In general, one has to consider more allocation functions, more implications of
monotonicity, and possibly an integrability constraint.
4. Dynamic revenue maximization
We ﬁrst demonstrate how the dynamic revenue maximization problem can be solved
if w is observable. This is, essentially, the dynamic programming problem analyzed by
Papastavrou, Rajagopalan, and Kleywegt, translated from values to virtual values. Nev-
ertheless, the logic of the derivation is somewhat involved, so we detail it below.
1. Without loss of generality, we can restrict attention to Markovian policies. The
optimality of Markovian, possibly randomized, policies is standard for all models
where, as is the case here, the per-period rewards and transition probabilities are
history-independent; see, for example, Theorem 11.1.1 in Puterman (2005)w h i c h
shows that for any history-dependent policy, there is a Markovian, possibly ran-
domized, policy with the same payoff.
2. If there is incomplete information about v, but complete information about the
weight requirement w, then Markovian, deterministic, and implementable poli-
cies are characterized for each t and c by the threshold property of condition (i) in
Proposition 1.
3. Naturally, in the given revenue maximization problem with complete informa-
tion about w, we need to restrict attention to interim individually rational policies
where no agent ever pays more than the utility obtained from her actual capacity
allocation. It is easy to see that for any Markov, deterministic, and implementable
allocation rule αc
t, the maximal, individually rational payment function that sup-






t(w v) = 1
0 if αc
t(w v) = 0,
where pc
t(w) = inf{v/αc
t(w v) = 1} as deﬁned in the above section. Otherwise, the
designer pays some positive subsidy to the agent, and this cannot be revenue max-
imizing.
4. At each period t and for each remaining capacity c, the designer’s problem under
complete information about w is equivalent to a simpler, one-dimensional static
problem where a known capacity needs to be allocated to the arriving agent andTheoretical Economics 6 (2011) Revenue maximization in the knapsack problem 163
where the seller has a salvage value for each remaining capacity: the salvage val-
ues in the static problem correspond to the continuation values in the dynamic
version. Analogous to the analysis of Myerson (1981), each static revenue maxi-
mization problem has a monotone (in the sense of condition (i) in Proposition 1),
nonrandomized solution as long as for any weight w, the agent’s conditional vir-
tual valuation v − (1 − F(v|w))/f(v|w) is increasing in v.8 If per-unit prices are set
at pc
t(w) in period t ≤ T (so T + 1 − t periods, including the current one, remain
until the deadline) with remaining capacity c and if the optimal Markovian policy


















R∗(c −w T −t)
+F(pc
t(w)|w)R∗(c T −t)
  ¯ fw(w)dw 
where ¯ fw denotes the marginal density in w and where R∗ denotes optimal rev-
enues, with R∗(c 0) = 0 for all c. The ﬁrst-order conditions for the revenue maxi-
mizing unit prices pc










= R∗(c T −t)−R∗(c −w T −t) 
5. By backward induction, and by the above reasoning, the seller has a Markov, non-
randomized optimal policy in the dynamic problem with complete information
about w. Note also that, by a simple duplication argument, R∗(c T + 1 − t) must
be monotone nondecreasing in c.
Points 1, 4, and 5 above imply that the restriction to deterministic and Markovian
allocation policies is without loss of generality. If the above solution to the relaxed
problem satisﬁes the incentive compatibility constraint in the weight dimension, i.e., if
wpc
t(w) happens to be monotone as required by condition (ii) of Proposition 1, then the
associated allocation where αc
t(w v) = 1 if and only if v ≥ pc
t(w) is also implementable
in the original problem with incomplete information about both v and w.I tt h e nc o n -
stitutes the revenue maximizing scheme that we are after. The next example illustrates
that condition (ii) of Proposition 1 can be binding.
8Note that the optimal policy continues to be deterministic even if virtual valuations are not monotonic.
This follows by a similar argument to the one given by Riley and Zeckhauser (1983). We nevertheless keep
the monotonicity assumption for simplicity and because we need related conditions for some of the sub-
sequent results.
9By our assumption of unbounded conditional virtual values (which is a mild assumption on distribu-
tions with unbounded support), these ﬁrst-order conditions always admit a solution and must, therefore,
be satisﬁed at the optimum.164 Dizdar, Gershkov, and Moldovanu Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
Example 1. Assume that T = 1. The distribution of the agents’ types is given by the





1−e−λv if w>w ∗
1−e−λv if w ≤ w∗,
where λ>λand w∗ ∈ (0 c).
In this case, for an observable weight request, the seller charges the take-it-or-leave-












if w ≤ w∗
and, therefore, wpc
t(w) is not monotone. ♦
4.1 The hazard rate stochastic ordering
A simple sufﬁcient condition that guarantees implementability of therelaxed solution is
a particular stochastic ordering of the conditional distributions of per-unit values: the
conditional distribution given a higher weight should be (weakly) statistically higher in
the hazard rate order than the conditional distribution given a lower weight. This is
similar to conditions found in static frameworks by Pai and Vohra, Iyengar and Kumar,
or Blackorby and Szalay.
Theorem 1. For each c, t,a n dw,l e tpc












= R∗(c T −t)−R∗(c −w T −t)  (1)
Assume that the following conditions hold.
(i) Forany w, theconditionalhazardrate f(v|w)/(1−F(v|w))isnondecreasingin v.10
(iii) For any w  ≥ w, and for any v, f(v|w)/(1−F(v|w))≥ f(v|w )/(1−F(v|w )).
Then wpc
t(w) is nondecreasing in w and, consequently, the underlying allocation where
αc
t(w v) = 1 if and only if v ≥ pc
t(w) is implementable. In particular, (1) characterizes
the revenue maximizing scheme under incomplete information about both values and
weights.
10Note that this condition already implies the needed monotonicity in v of the conditional virtual value
for all w.Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Revenue maximization in the knapsack problem 165
An important special case for which the conditions of Theorem 1 hold is where the
distribution of per-unit values is independent of the distribution of weights and has an
increasing hazard rate.
4.2 T h er o l eo fc o n c a v i t y
A major result for the case where capacity comes in discrete units and where all weights
are equal is that optimal expected revenue is concave in capacity (see Gallego and van
Ryzin1994foracontinuoustimeframeworkwithPoissonarrivalsandBitranandMond-
schein 1997 for a discrete time setting). This is a very intuitive property since it says that
additional capacity is more valuable to the designer when capacity itself is scarce. Due
to the more complicated combinatorial nature of the knapsack problem with heteroge-
neous weights, concavity need not generally hold (see Papastavrou et al. 1996 for exam-
ples where concavity of expected welfare in the framework with complete information
fails). When concavity does hold, the optimal per-unit virtual value thresholds for the
relaxed problem increase with weight, which facilitates implementation for the case of
two-dimensional private information.
Our main result in this subsection identiﬁes a condition on the distribution of types
that, together with concavity of the expected revenue in the remaining capacity, ensures
that for each t and c, wpc
t(w) is increasing.
Theorem 2. Assume the following conditions.
(i) The expected revenue R∗(c T +1−t)is a concave function of c for all times t.
(ii) For any w ≤ w , v−(1−F(v|w))/f(v|w)≥ vw/w −(1−F(vw/w |w ))/f(vw/w |w ).
For each c, t,a n dw,l e tpc
t(w) denote the solution to the revenue maximizing problem
under complete information about w, determined recursively by (1).T h e n wpc
t(w) is
nondecreasing in w, and hence the underlying allocation where αc
t(w v) = 1 if and only
if v ≥ pc
t(w) is implementable. In particular, (1) characterizes the revenue maximizing
scheme under incomplete information about both values and weights.
Remark 1. Thesufﬁcient conditions forimplementability used in Theorem1 are, taken
together, stronger than condition (ii) in Theorem 2. To see this, assume that for any w,
theconditionalhazardratef(v|w)/(1−F(v|w))isincreasinginv,andthatforanyw  ≥ w



















w  |w  
f
 vw
w  |w    
where the ﬁrst inequality follows by the monotonicity of the hazard rate, and the second
follows by the stochastic order assumption. Note also that condition (ii) of Theorem 2
can be formulated as requiring that the functions αv − (1 − F(αv|w/α))/f(αv|w/α) are
nondecreasing in α. Finally, note that this condition will play an important role for im-
plementabilityoftheasymptoticallyoptimalpolicythatweconstructinSection 5below.166 Dizdar, Gershkov, and Moldovanu Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
We next modify a result of Papastavrou et al. (1996) so as to identify conditions on
the joint distribution F(w v) that imply concavity of expected revenue with respect to
c for all periods, as required by the Theorem 2.11 It is convenient to introduce the joint
distribution ofweightand totalvaluation u = vw, whichwedenoteby G(w u) with den-
sity g(w u). By means of a transformation of variables, the densities f and g are related







g(w u)du= ¯ gw(w) 
An increasing virtual value implies that the virtual total value is increasing in u with
strictly positive derivative for any given w:






= wˆ v(v w) 
We write ˆ u−1(ˆ u w) for the inverse of ˆ u(u w) with respect to u and deﬁne a distribution
ˆ G(ˆ u w) by both ˆ G(ˆ u|w):= G(ˆ u−1(ˆ u w)|w) for all w and ¯ ˆ gw(w) := ¯ gw(w). On the level of
ˆ v, this corresponds to ˆ F(ˆ v|w)= F(ˆ v−1(ˆ v w)|w) and ¯ ˆ fw(w) = ¯ fw(w).
Theorem 3. Assume that the conditional distribution ˆ G(w|ˆ u) is concave in w for all ˆ u,
that both ˆ g(w|ˆ u) and dˆ g(w|ˆ u)/dw are bounded, and that the total virtual value ˆ u has a
ﬁnitemean. Then,intherevenuemaximizationproblemwherethedesignerhascomplete
information about w, the expected revenue R∗(c T + 1 − t) is concave as a function of c
for all times t.
Example 2. A simple setting where the conditions of Theorem 2 are satisﬁed while
those of Theorem 1 are violated is obtained as follows. Assume that G(w u) is such
that u and w are independent, the hazard rate gu(u)/(1 − Gu(u)) is nondecreas-
ing, and Gw is concave.12 Then condition (i) of Theorem 2 is satisﬁed according
to Theorem 3 because the ˆ G(w|ˆ u) are concave. Consider then w<w  . By inde-
pendence of u and w,w eh a v ew ˆ v(vw/w  w ) = ˆ u(vw w ) = ˆ u(vw w) = wˆ v(v w) and
hence ˆ v(v w) = (w /w)ˆ v(vw/w  w ).A s w /w > 1, this implies condition (ii) of The-
orem 2 in the relevant domain where virtual values are nonnegative. However, as
we show now, condition (ii) of Theorem 1, i.e., the hazard rate ordering, is violated.
Indeed, the equation we have just derived implies also that f(v|w)/(1 − F(v|w)) =
(w/w )f(vw/w |w )/(1 − F(vw/w |w )). But the conditional hazard rates of F are non-
decreasing (because Gu has nondecreasing hazard rate) and w/w  < 1,s ot h a tf(v|w)/
(1 − F(v|w)) = (w/w )f(vw/w |w )/(1 − F(vw/w |w )) < f(v|w )/(1 − F(v|w )),w h i c h
contradicts the hazard rate ordering of Theorem 1. ♦
11In the Appendix we also provide an elementary proof of the result of Papastavrou et al. (1996), since
a proof is neither contained in the above-mentioned paper nor in the related one by Kleywegt and Pa-
pastavrou (2001). Moreover, we were unable to ﬁnd a more general result from ﬁnite horizon stochastic
dynamic programming that ensures concavity of expected value in the state variable c,w h i c hi so n l yap a r t
of the relevant state description.
12We also assume that the other mild technical conditions of Theorem 3 are satisﬁed.Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Revenue maximization in the knapsack problem 167
5. Asymptotically optimal and time-independent pricing
The optimal policy identiﬁed above requires price adjustments in every period and for
any quantity request w. These dynamics are arguably too complicated to be applied in
practice. Gallego and van Ryzin (1994) use an asymptotic argument to show that the
theoretical gain from optimal dynamic pricing compared to a suitably chosen, time-
independentpolicyisusuallysmallinthesettingwithunitdemands. Ourmaintheorem
in this section extends their result to the dynamic knapsack problem with general dis-
tribution of types. We construct a static nonlinear price schedule that uses the existing
correlationsbetween w and v,andshowthatitisasymptoticallyoptimalifbothcapacity
and time horizon go to inﬁnity.
While the basic strategy of the proof follows the suggestion made by Gallego and
van Ryzin, there are several major differences. In fact, in Section 5 of their paper these
authors also consider the case of heterogeneous capacity demands. However, they as-
sume that weights and values are independent and, most importantly, their optimality
benchmark does not even allow per-unit prices to depend on weight requests. But, as
wesaw above, suchweight dependencyis ageneral property ofthedynamicallyoptimal
solution, even if w and v are independent. We therefore take our solution of the relaxed
problemastheoptimalitybenchmarkandwealsoconsidergeneraltypedistributions F.
As above, we start by focusing on the case of observable weights. We then show that
condition (ii) of Theorem 2 is a sufﬁcient condition for implementability for the case
with two-dimensional private information.
Like Gallego and van Ryzin, we ﬁrst solve a simpler, suitably chosen deterministic
maximization problem. The revenue obtained in the solution to that problem provides
an upper bound for the optimal expected revenue of the stochastic problem, and the
solution itself suggests the use of per-unit prices that depend on weight requests, but
thatareconstantintime. Wenextshowthatthederivedpolicyisasymptoticallyoptimal
also in the original stochastic problem where both capacity and time go to inﬁnity: the
ratio of expected revenue from following the considered policy over expected revenue
from the optimal Markovian policy converges to 1. Moreover, there are various ways to
quantify this ratio for moderately large capacities and time horizons.
Let us ﬁrst recall some assumptions and introduce further notation. The marginal
density ¯ fw(w) and the conditional densities f(v|w) pin down the distribution of (inde-
pendent) arriving types (wt vt)T
t=1.G i v e n w, the demanded per-unit price p and the
probability λw of a request being accepted are related by λw(p) = 1−F(p|w).L e tpw(λ)
be the inverse of λ and note that this is well deﬁned on (0 1]. Because of monotonicity
of conditional virtual values, the instantaneous (expected) per-unit revenue functions
rw(λ) := λpw(λ) are strictly concave and each one attains a unique interior maximum.
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Consequently, rw is strictly concave, strictly increasing up to the λw ∗ that satisﬁes
ˆ v(pw(λw ∗) w) = 0, and strictly decreasing from there on.
5.1 The deterministic problem
We now formulate an auxiliary deterministic problem that closely resembles the relaxed








t )t=1     T










t w ¯ fw(w) ≤ Cap(w) a.s. and
  ∞
0
Cap(w)dw ≤ C  (3)
In words, we analyze a problem where the following statements are true.
1. The capacity C needs to be divided into capacities Cap(w), one for each w.
2. In each w subproblem, a deterministic quantity request of w ¯ fw(w) arrives in each
period, and λw
t determines a share (not a probability!) of this request that is ac-
cepted and sold at per-unit price pw(λw
t ).
3. In each subproblem, the allocated capacity over time cannot exceed Cap(w) and
total allocated capacity in all subproblems
  ∞
0 Cap(w)dw cannot exceed C.
4. Thedesigner’sgoalistomaximizetotalrevenue. Wecalltherevenueatthesolution
Rd(C T).
As rw is strictly concave and increasing up to λw ∗, it is straightforward to verify that,
given a choice Cap(w), the solution to the w subproblem
max
(λw
t )t=1     T









t w ¯ fw(w) ≤ Cap(w)
is given by
λw











Accordingly, the revenue in the w subproblem is rw(λw d)Tw ¯ fw(w).
Proposition 2. The solution to the deterministic problem given by (2) and (3) is char-
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(i) ˆ v(pw(λw d) w) = β(C T) = const
(ii) λw





0 Cap(w)dw = min(C T
  ∞
0 λw ∗w ¯ fw(w)dw).
To get an intuition for the above result, observe that the marginal increase of the













Proposition 2 says that, optimally, the capacity should be split in such a way that
the marginal revenue from increasing Cap(w) is the same for all w. Actually solving the
problem amounts to the simple static exercise of determining the constant β(C T) in
accordance with the integral feasibility constraint.
The above construction is justiﬁed by the following two-step argument: on the one
hand, we show in Theorem 4 below that the optimal revenue in the deterministic prob-
lem, Rd(C T), bounds from above the optimal revenue in the original stochastic case.
On the other hand, as we show in Section 5.2, the optimal solution of the deterministic
problem serves to deﬁne a simple time-independent policy that in the stochastic prob-
lem captures revenues RTI(C T) such that RTI(C T)/Rd(C T) converges to 1 as C and
T go to inﬁnity. Combining these two points yields the kind of asymptotic optimality
result we want to establish.
Since we assume here that weights are observable, a Markovian policy α for the orig-
inal stochastic problem is characterized by the acceptance probabilities λ
wt
t [ct] contin-
gent on current time t, remaining capacity ct, and weight request wt. Expected revenue
from policy α at the beginning of period t (i.e., when there are (T − t + 1) periods left)
with remaining capacity ct is given by
Rα(ct T−t +1) = Eα












s [cs])} ≤ ct 
Here, the constraint must hold almost surely when following α.A s b e f o r e , w e w r i t e
R∗(ct T−t +1) for the optimal revenue, i.e., the supremum of expected revenues taken
over all feasible Markovian policies α.
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5.2 A simple policy for the stochastic problem
Having established the upper bound of Theorem 4, we now proceed with the second
part of our two-step argument outlined in the preceding section. We use the optimal
solution of the deterministic problem to deﬁne a w-contingent yet time-independent
policy αTI for the stochastic case as follows.
1. Given C and T, solve the deterministic problem to obtain β(C T), λw d,a n dt h u s
pw d := pw(λw d) = ˆ v−1(β(C T) w).
2. Inthestochasticproblemchargetheseweight-contingentprices pw d fortheentire
time horizon, provided that the quantity request does not exceed the remaining
capacity. Otherwise, charge a price equal to +∞ (i.e., reject the request).
Note that under condition (ii) of Theorem 2, the time-independent policy αTI is also
implementable if weights are not observable! Indeed, setting all virtual valuation thresh-
olds equal to a constant is like setting them optimally for linear and hence concave sal-
vage values.
We now determine how well the time-independent policy constructed above per-
forms compared to the optimal Markovian policy. Recall that we do this by comparing
its expected revenue, RTI(C T), with the optimal revenue in the deterministic problem,
Rd(C T), which, as we know by Theorem 4, provides an upper bound for the optimal
revenue in the stochastic problem, R∗(C T).
















In particular, limmin(C T)→∞
RTI(C T)
Rd(C T) = 1.
We have chosen to focus on these two general limit results, but various other quan-
titative results could be proven by similar techniques at the expense of slightly more
technical effort and possibly some further assumptions on the distribution F.13 This
should be clear from the proof in the Appendix. Note that since policy αTI is station-
ary, it does not generate incentives to postpone arrivals even in a more complex model
where buyers are patient and can choose their arrival time.
13Since Rd(C T) ≥ R∗(C T) ≥ RTI(C T) (the ﬁrst inequality is Theorem 4 and the second follows by
optimality), our estimate in Theorem 5(ii) immediately extends to R∗(C T)/Rd(C T) or to RTI(C T)/
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Remark 2. In a complete information knapsack model, Lin et al. (2008) study policies
that start by accepting only high value requests and then switch over to accepting also
lower values as time goes by. They establish asymptotic optimality of such policies (with
carefully chosen switchover times) as available capacity and time go to inﬁnity. In other
words, their prices are time-dependent but do not condition on the weight request. It
is easy to show that, in our incomplete information model, such policies are, in gen-
eral, suboptimal. Consider ﬁrst a one-period example where the seller has capacity 2
and where the arriving agent has either a weight request of 1 or 2 (equally likely). If the
weight request is 1 (2), the agent’s per-unit value distributes uniformly between 0 and
1 (between 1 and 2). The optimal mechanism in this case is as follows: if the buyer re-
quests one unit, the seller sells it for a price of 0.5, and if the buyer requests two units,
the seller sells each unit at a price of 1. Note that this policy is implementable since
the requested per-unit price is monotonically increasing in the weight request. The ex-
pectedrevenueis 9/8. If,however,thesellerisforcedtosellallunitsatthesameper-unit
price without conditioning on the weight request, he will charge the price of 1 for each
unit, yielding an expected revenue of1, and thus lose 1/8 versus theoptimal policy. Now
replicate this problem so that there are T periods and capacity C = 2T. Then the ex-
pected revenue from the optimal mechanism is 9/8T, while the expected revenue from
the constrained mechanism is only T. Obviously, the constrained mechanism is not
asymptotically optimal.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.  ⇒. So assume that conditions (i) and (ii) are satisﬁed, and






t(w v) = 1
0 if αc
t(w v) = 0.
Consider then an arrival of type (w v) in period t with remaining capacity c.T h e r ea r e
two cases.
(a) αc
t(w v) = 1.I n p a r t i c u l a r , v ≥ pc
t(w). Then truth-telling yields utility w(v −
pc
t(w)) ≥ 0. Assume thattheagentreportsinstead (  w   v).I fαc
t(  w   v)= 0, thentheagent’s
utility is zero and the deviation is not proﬁtable. Assume then that αc
t(  w   v) = 1.B yt h e
form of the utility function, a report of   w<wis never proﬁtable. But for   w ≥ w,t h e
agent’s utility is wv −   wpc
t(  w) ≤ w(v − pc
t(w)), where we used condition (ii). Therefore,
such a deviation is also not proﬁtable.
(b) αc
t(w v) = 0.I n p a r t i c u l a r , v ≤ pc
t(w). Truth-telling yields here utility of zero.
Assume that the agent reports instead (  w   v).I fαc
t(  w   v) = 0, then the agent’s utility re-
mains zero and the deviation is not proﬁtable. Assume then that αc
t(  w   v) = 1.B y t h e
form of the utility function, a report of   w<wis never proﬁtable. Thus, consider the case
where   w ≥ w. In this case, the agent’s utility is wv −   wpc
t(  w) ≤ w(v − pc
t(w)) ≤ 0,w h e r e
we used condition (ii). Therefore, such a deviation is also not proﬁtable.172 Dizdar, Gershkov, and Moldovanu Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
⇐ . Consider now an implementable, deterministic, and Markovian allocation
policy {αc
t}t c. Assume ﬁrst, by contradiction, that condition (i) in the statement of
the proposition is not satisﬁed. Then there exist (w v) and (w v ) such that v  >v ,
αc
t(w v) = 1,a n dαc
t(w v ) = 0. We obtain the chain of inequalities wv  − qc
t(w v) >
wv − qc
t(w v) ≥− qc
t(w v ), where the second inequality follows by incentive compati-
bility for type (w v). This shows that a deviation to a report (w v) is proﬁtable for type
(w v ), a contradiction to implementability. Therefore, condition (i) must hold.
In particular, note that for any two types who have the same weight request, (w v)
and (w v ), if both are accepted, i.e., αc
t(w v) = αc
t(w v ) = 1, the payment must be the
same (otherwise the type that needs to make the higher payment would deviate and
report the other type). Denote this payment by rc
t (w). Note also that any two types
(w v) and (w  v ) such that αc
t(w v) = αc
t(w  v ) = 0 must also make the same payment
(otherwise the type that needs to make the higher payment would deviate and report
the other type) and denote this payment by s.
Assume now, by contradiction, that condition (ii) does not hold. Then there exist w
and w  such that w  >wbut w pc
t(w )<w p c
t(w).I np a r t i c u l a r ,w pc
t(w )<∞ and there-
fore pc
t(w )<∞.
Assume ﬁrst that pc
t(w) < ∞.W eh a v ew pc
t(w ) − rc
t (w ) = wpc
t(w) − rc
t (w) =− s be-
cause, by incentive compatibility, both types (w pc
t(w)) and (w  pc
t(w )) must be indif-
ferent between getting their request and not getting it. Since by assumption w pc
t(w )<
wpc
t(w), we obtain that rc
t (w )<r c
t (w).C o n s i d e rn o wat y p e(w v) for which v>p c
t(w).
By reporting truthfully, this type gets utility wv − rc
t (w), while by deviating to (w  v),h e
gets utility wv−rc
t (w )>wv−rc
t (w), a contradiction to incentive compatibility.
Assume now that pc
t(w) is inﬁnite, and therefore wpc
t(w) is inﬁnite. Consider a type
(w  v)where v>p c
t(w ). The utility of this type is w v −rc
t (w )>w  pc
t(w )−rc
t (w ) =− s.
In particular, rc
t (w ) must be ﬁnite. By reporting truthfully, a type (w v) gets utility −s,
whilebydeviatingtoareportof(w  v),hegetswv−rc
t (w ).F o rv largeenough,weobtain
wv−rc
t (w )>−s, a contradiction to implementability.
Thus, condition (ii) must hold and, in particular, the payment rc
t (w) is monotonic
in w.  
Proof of Theorem 1.L e tw<w  . We need to show that wpc
t(w) − w pc
t(w ) ≤ 0.I f
pc
t(w) ≤ pc
t(w ), the result is clear. Assume then that pc
t(w) > pc
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where the last inequality follows by the derivation above. Hence wpc
t(w) − w pc
t(w ) ≤ 0
as desired.  
Proof of Theorem 2. For any concave function φ and for any x<y<zin its domain,










Then consider w<w   and let x = c − w  <y= c − w<z= c. For the case of a concave
revenue, the lemma then yields
R∗(c −w T −t)−R∗(c −w  T−t)
w  −w
≥
R∗(c T −t)−R∗(c −w  T−t)
w 
≥
R∗(c T −t)−R∗(c −w T −t)
w
 








R∗(c T −t)−R∗(c −w  T−t)
w 
≥

































t(w)|w    
wherethelastinequalityfollowsbytheconditioninthestatementoftheTheorem. Since
virtual values are increasing, this yields pc
t(w ) ≥ (w/w )pc
t(w) ⇔ w pc
t(w ) ≥ wpc
t(w) as
desired.  
For the proof of Theorem 3, we ﬁrst need a lemma on maximization of expected
welfareunder completeinformation. The result appears (without proof) in Papastavrou
et al. (1996).
Lemma 1. Assume that the total value u has ﬁnite mean, and that both g(w|u) and
dg(w|u)/dw are bounded and continuous. Consider the allocation policy that maximizes
expected welfare under complete information (i.e., upon arrival the agent’s type is re-174 Dizdar, Gershkov, and Moldovanu Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
vealed to the designer). If G(w|u) is concave in w for all u, then the optimal expected
welfare, denoted Uc
t , is twice continuously differentiable and concave in the remaining
capacity c for all periods t ≤ T.
Proof. Note that, for notational convenience throughout this proof, we index optimal
expected welfare by the current time t and not by periods remaining to deadline. By
standard arguments, the optimal policy for this unconstrained dynamic optimization
problem is deterministic and Markovian, and Uc
t is nondecreasing in remaining capac-
ity c by a simple strategy duplication argument. Moreover, the optimal policy can be
characterized by weight thresholds wc
t(u) ≤ c:I fc remains at time t and a request whose
acceptance would generate value u arrives, then it is accepted if and only if w ≤ wc
t(u).
If Uc





t+1   (5)
Otherwise, we have wc
t(u) = c.
We now prove the lemma by backward induction. At time t = T, i.e., in the deadline






This is concave in c because all G(c|u) are concave by assumption, because u¯ gu(u) is
positive, and because the distribution of u has a ﬁnite mean. Since both g(w|u) and
dg(w|u)/dw are bounded and continuous, Uc
T is also twice continuously differentiable.
Suppose now that the lemma has been proven down to time t + 1. The optimal ex-




















¯ gu(u)du  (6)
We proceed to show concavity with respect to c of the term in brackets, for all u.T h i si n
turn implies concavity of Uc
t and hence, with a short additional argument for differen-
tiability, is sufﬁcient to conclude the induction step. We distinguish the cases u>Uc
t+1
for which the indifference condition (5) does not hold and u ≤ Uc
t+1 for which it does.
For both cases, we demonstrate that the second derivative (one-sided if necessary) of
the bracket term with respect to c is nonpositive and thus we establish global concavity.
Case 1. u>U c





t+1. By continuity of Uc
t+1, this representation also holdsin a small interval












































































The last term is nonpositive by the concavity of Uc
t+1; the ﬁrst term is nonpositive be-
cause u>Uc
t+1 and because G(c|u) has a nonincreasing density by assumption. In ad-
dition, g(c|u)(dUc

























t+1 /dc2)g(w|u)dw may be bounded from above by g(c|u) ×   c
0 (d2Uc−w
t+1 /dc2)dw because of the decreasing density and because d2Uc−w























































Case 2. u ≤ Uc
















t+1 g(w|u)dw  (9)





t+1 to obtain an expression for dwc


































   
w=c−wc






   
w=c−wc
t (u)
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By concavity of Uc
t+1, its derivative is nonincreasing and hence the identity (10) yields,
in particular, dwc
























































































































































































t+1,a sw e l la sd2Uc−w
t+1 /dc2 = d2Uc−w
t+1 /dw2.
Noting that (10)i m p l i e st h a tdwc
t(u)/dc ≤ 1 and once more using concavity of Uc
t+1,w e
may bound the ﬁrst term from above. Since g(w|u) is nonincreasing in w, we can also










































Taken together, (8)a n d( 11) establish concavity of the integrand in (6)w i t hr e s p e c tt oc.
This implies that Uc
t is concave. Having a second look at the computations just per-
formed reveals that the integrand in (6) has a kink in the second derivative at u = Uc
t+1.Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Revenue maximization in the knapsack problem 177
However, this event has measure zero for any given c, so that we also get that Uc
t is twice
continuously differentiable. This completes the induction step.  
Proof of Theorem 3. The main idea of the proof is to translate the problem of setting
revenue maximizing prices when w is observable into the problem of maximizing wel-
fare with respect to virtual values (rather than the values themselves), and then to use
Lemma 1.
To begin with, note that there is a dual way to describe the policy that maximizes
expected welfare under complete information. In the proof of Lemma 1,w ec h a r a c t e r -
izeditbyoptimalweightthresholdswc
t(u). Alternatively,givenanyrequestedquantity w
(not greater than the remaining c), we may set a valuation per unit threshold vc
t(w).R e -
quests above this valuation are accepted; those below are not. Such optimal thresholds



























  ¯ fw(w)dw 
In contrast, the optimal expected revenue with complete information about w but in-

















R∗(c −w T −t) (13)
+F(pc
t(w)|w)R∗(c T −t)
  ¯ fw(w)dw 
where pc
t(w) are the per-unit prices from (1). We rephrase this in terms of ˆ F,w h o s e
deﬁnitionrequiresmonotonicityofvirtualvalues. Setting ˆ vc
t(w) := ˆ v(pc
t(w) w),wehave ,
on the one hand,
F(pc
t(w)|w)= ˆ F(ˆ vc
t(w)|w) 
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1− ˆ F(ˆ vc
t(w)|w)
 
R∗(c −w T −t)+ ˆ F(ˆ vc
t(w)|w)R∗(c T −t)
 ¯ˆ fw(w)dw 
Comparing this with (12), it follows that maximizing expected revenue when w is ob-
servable is equivalent to maximizing expected welfare with respect to the distribution
of weight and conditional virtual valuation (note the identical zero boundary values at
T + 1). Invoking Lemma 1 applied to ˆ G,w es e et h a tR∗(c T + 1 − t)is concave with re-
spect to c for all t (note that the fact that the support of virtual valuations contains also
negative numbers does not matter for the argument of Lemma 1).  
Proof of Proposition 2. The proposition is an immediate consequence of the char-
acterization (4) of optimal solutions for the w subproblems given Cap(w),a n do fa
straightforward variational argument ensuring that marginal revenues from marginal
increase of Cap(w) must be constant almost surely in w.  
Proof of Theorem 4. We need to distinguish two cases.
Case 1. Assume that C>T
  ∞
0 λw ∗w ¯ fw(w)dw.I nt h i sc a s e ,β(C T) = 0 and Rd(C T) =
T
  ∞
0 rw(λw ∗)w ¯ fw(w)dw. We also know that R∗(C T) ≤ R∗(+∞ T),w h e r eR∗(+∞ T)
denotes the optimal expected revenue from a stochastic problem without any capacity
constraint. But for such a problem, the optimal Markovian policy maximizes at each
period the instantaneous expected revenue upon observing wt, wtrwt(λ).T h a t i s , t h e
optimal policy sets λ
wt
t [+∞] = λw ∗.T h u s ,
R∗(C T) ≤ R∗(+∞ T)= T
  ∞
0
wrw(λw ∗) ¯ fw(w)dw = Rd(C T) 
Case 2. Assume now that C ≤ T
  ∞



















The Euler–Lagrange equation is (drw/dλ)(Cap(w)/(Tw ¯ fw(w))) = μ.H e n c e ,i fw ew r i t e
Rd(C T μ) for the optimal value of the above problem and if we let μ = β(C T),
where β(C T) is the constant from Proposition 2, then the solution equals the solu-
tion of the constrained deterministic problem. In particular,
  ∞
0 Cap(w)dw = C and
Rd(C T β(C T))= Rd(C T) .
Recall that for the stochastic problem and for any Markovian policy α,w eh a v e
Rα(C T) = Eα
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and deﬁne
Rα(C T β(C T))= Rα(C T)+β(C T)
 
C −Eα












t [ct])} ≤ C a.s. 
we have Rα(C T) ≤ Rα(C T β(C T)). We show below that, for arbitrary α (which satis-
ﬁes the capacity constraint or not), it holds that
Rα(C T β(C T))≤ Rd(C T β(C T))  (14)
This yields, for any α that is admissible in the original problem,
Rα(C T) ≤ Rα(C T β(C T))≤ Rd(C T β(C T))= Rd(C T) 
Taking the supremum over α then concludes the proof for the second case.
It remains to prove (14). The argument uses the ﬁltration {Ft}T
t=1 of σ-algebras that
contain information prior to time t (in particular the value of ct) and, in addition, the
currently observed wt:
Rα(C T β(C T))= Eα
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For the inequality, we have used that λw d maximizes rw(λ)−β(C T)λ.  
For the proof of Theorem 5, we ﬁrst need a lemma.
Lemma 2. Let RTI(C T) be the revenue obtained from the stationary policy αTI.L e t
(  wt   vt)T
t=1 be an independent copy of the process (wt vt)T
t=1.T h e n
(i)
RTI(C T) = E(wt)T
t=1





 t−1  
s=1
  wsI{  vs≥p  ws d} >C−wt
























rw(λw d)w ¯ fw(w)dw
 
whereμd := min(C T
  ∞
0 λw ∗w ¯ fw(w)dw)/T,I1 = I{w≤(T−t+1)μd},I2 = I{w>(T−t+1)μd},
and σ2
d := E[w2I{v≥pw d}]−μ2
d =
  ∞
0 w2λw d ¯ fw(w)dw −μ2
d.
Proof. (i) Expected revenue RTI(C T) may be written as
RTI(C T) = E(wt vt)T
t=1





















To simplify the second term, we use the fact that vt and (ws vs)t−1






































  T  
t=1
pwt dwtλwt dP
 t−1  
s=1
  wsI{  vs≥p  ws d} >C−wt
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= E(wt)T
t=1
  T  
t=1
rwt(λwt d)wtP
 t−1  
s=1




(ii) Recall that Rd(C T) = T
  ∞
0 rw(λw d)w ¯ fw(w)dw. Observe furthermore that
λw d depends on C and T only through the ratio Ceff/T,w h e r eCeff = min(C 
T
  ∞
0 λw ∗w ¯ fw(w)dw),v i aE[wI{v≥pw d}]=
  ∞
0 wλw d ¯ fw(w)dw = Ceff/T = μd.O b s e r v e
ﬁrst that
P
 t−1  
s=1
  wsI{  vs≥p  ws d} >C−wt
 
≤ P
 t−1  
s=1
  wsI{  vs≥p  ws d} >Tμ d −wt
 
= P
 t−1  
s=1
  wsI{  vs≥p  ws d} −(t −1)μd >( T−t +1)μd −wt
 
 
We trivially bound the last expression by 1 if (T − t + 1)μd − wt ≤ 0 and otherwise use
Chebychev’s inequality to deduce
P
 t−1  
s=1
  wsI{  vs≥p  ws d} −(t −1)μd >( T−t +1)μd −wt
 
≤ P
  t−1  
s=1
  wsI{  vs≥p  ws d} −(t −1)μd
 2




   t−1
s=1   wsI{  vs≥p  ws d} −(t −1)μd
 2 
((T −t +1)μd −wt)2 =
(t −1)σ2
d
((T −t +1)μd −wt)2 
Asweareboundingaprobability, wecanagainreplacethisestimatebythetrivialbound
1 whenever it is better, i.e., if wt is smaller than but close to (T −t +1)μd.T h u s ,
E(wt vt)T
t=1
























Finally, dividing by Rd(C T) yields the desired estimate.  
Proof of Theorem 5. (i) The starting point is the estimate from Lemma 2(ii). Note
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Moreover, for ﬁxed w, for arbitrary η ∈ (0 1), and for t ≤ ηT,w eh a v ew<( 1 − η)Tμd
eventually as T C→∞, C/T = const. Moreover,
(t −1)σ2
d
((T −t +1)μd −w)2 ≤
ηTσ2
d
((1−η)Tμd −w)2 → 0 as T →∞  















¯ fw(w)dw → 0
in the considered limit, for arbitrary η ∈ (0 1) and for t ≤ ηT. Consequently, also the
term that is subtracted in the estimate Lemma 2(ii) converges to zero.
(ii) A straightforward application of the proof by Gallego and van Ryzin is possible
for this last part. For completeness, we spell it out. If w and v are independent, all the
λw d for different w coincide, as do the λw ∗.C a l lt h e mλd and λ∗, respectively. We have
then










  T  
t=1
wtI{vt≥p(λd)} −





We use now the following estimate for E[(X − k)+],w h e r eX is a random variable with






Note that by independence,
E

















= T(E[w2]λd −E[w]2(λd)2) 
If λ∗TE[w] >Cand hence if λd = C/(TE[w]), this yields
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If λ∗TE[w]≤C and hence if λd = λ∗,t h e nC ≥ E[
 T





σ2/2.T h u s ,


























Armstrong, Mark (1996), “Multiproduct nonlinear pricing.” Econometrica, 64, 51–75.
[158]
Bitran, Gabriel R. and Susana V. Mondschein (1997), “Periodic pricing of seasonal prod-
ucts in retailing.” Management Science, 43, 64–79. [165]
Blackorby, Charles and Dezsö Szalay (2007), “Multidimensional screening, afﬁliation,
andfullseparation.”WarwickEconomicResearchPaper802,DepartmentofEconomics,
University of Warwick. [159]
Che, Yeon-Koo and Ian Gale (2000), “The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-
constrained buyer.” Journal of Economic Theory, 92, 198–233. [159]
Gallego, Guillermo and Garrett van Ryzin (1994), “Optimal dynamic pricing of invento-
ries with stochastic demand over ﬁnite horizons.” Management Science, 40, 999–1020.
[158, 165, 167]
Gershkov, Alex and Benny Moldovanu (2009), “Dynamic revenue maximization with
heterogeneous objects: A mechanism design approach.” American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics, 1(2), 168–198. [158]
Iyengar,GarudandAnujKumar(2008),“Optimalprocurementmechanismsfordivisible
goods with capacitated suppliers.” Review of Economic Design, 12, 129–154. [159]
Jehiel, Philippe, Benny Moldovanu, and Ennio Stacchetti (1999), “Multidimensional
mechanism design for auctions with externalities.” Journal of Economic Theory, 85,
258–293. [158]
Kincaid, W. M. and D. A. Darling (1963), “An inventory pricing problem.” Journal of
Mathematical Analysis and Applications, 7, 183–208. [158]
Kittsteiner, Thomas and Benny Moldovanu (2005), “Priority auctions and queue disci-
plines that depend on processing time.” Management Science, 51, 236–248. [159]
Kleywegt, Anton J. and Jason D. Papastavrou (2001), “The dynamic and stochastic knap-
sack problem with random sized items.” Operations Research, 49, 26–41. [158, 166]184 Dizdar, Gershkov, and Moldovanu Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
Lin, Grace Y., Lu Yingdong, and David D. Yao (2008), “The stochastic knapsack revisited:
Switch-over policies and dynamic pricing.” Operations Research, 56, 945–957. [160, 171]
Myerson, Roger B. (1981), “Optimal auction design.” Mathematics of Operations Re-
search, 6, 58–73. [163]
Pai, Mallesh M. and Rakesh Vohra (2009), “Optimal dynamic auctions.” Unpublished
paper, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University. [159]
Papastavrou, Jason D., Srikanth Rajagopalan, and Anton J. Kleywegt (1996), “The dy-
namic and stochastic knapsack problem with deadlines.” Management Science, 42,
1706–1718. [158, 165, 166, 173]
Puterman, Martin L. (2005), Markov Decision Processes. Wiley, Hoboken, New Jersey.
[162]
Riley, John and Richard Zeckhauser (1983), “Optimal selling strategies: When to haggle,
when to hold ﬁrm.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98, 267–289. [163]
Rochet, Jean-Charles (1985), “The taxation principle and multitime Hamilton-Jacobi
equations.” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 14, 113–128. [158]
Rochet, Jean-Charles and Lars A. Stole (2003), “The economics of multidimensional
screening.” In Advances in Economics and Econometrics, Volume I (Mathias Dewa-
tripont, Lars Peter Hansen, and Stephen J. Turnovsky, eds.), 150–197, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge. [158]
Ross, Keith W. and Danny H. K. Tsang (1989), “The stochastic knapsack problem.” IEEE
Transactions on Communications, 37, 740–747. [158]
Talluri, Kalyan T. and Garrett J. Van Ryzin (2004), The Theory and Practice of Revenue
Management. Springer, New York. [158]
Submitted 2010-1-5. Final version accepted 2010-7-29. Available online 2010-7-29.